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ABSTRACT 
Aim  
To identify those contexts and mechanisms that enable or constrain the implementation of 
Rapid Response Systems on acute general hospital wards to recognise and respond to patient 
deterioration.  
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Background 
Rapid Response Systems allow deteriorating patients to be recognised using Early Warning 
Systems, referred early via escalation protocols and managed at the bedside by competent 
staff.   
Design 
Realist Evaluation 
Methods 
The research design was an embedded multiple case study approach of four wards in two 
hospitals in Northern Ireland which followed the principles of Realist Evaluation. We used 
various mixed methods including individual and focus group interviews, observation of 
nursing practice between June - November 2010 and document analysis of Early Warning 
Systems audit data between May - October 2010 and hospital acute care training records over 
4.5 years from 2003-2008.  Data were analysed using NiVivo8 and SPPS.   
Results 
A cross case analysis highlighted similar patterns of factors which enabled or constrained 
successful recognition, referral and response to deteriorating patients in practice. Key 
enabling factors were the use of clinical judgement by experienced nurses and the 
empowerment of nurses as a result of organisational change associated with implementation 
of Early Warning System protocols. Key constraining factors were low staffing and 
inappropriate skill mix levels, rigid implementation of protocols and culturally-embedded 
suboptimal communication processes.   
Conclusion 
Successful implementation of Rapid Response Systems was dependent on adopting 
organisational and cultural changes that facilitated staff empowerment, flexible 
implementation of protocols and ongoing experiential learning.   
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SUMMARY STATEMENT 
Why is this research needed?  
• Research has provided limited clinical answers to explain why such a conceptually logical 
model as RRS does or does not work in practice. 
• There is a need to understand those contexts and mechanisms that have an impact on 
achievement of desired RRS outcomes. 
• No research to date has used a realist evaluation approach to test the RRS programme 
theory. 
What are the key findings?  
• The use of clinical judgement by experienced nurses enabled early recognition of patients.  
• Implementation of EWS protocols facilitated successful organisational change.  
• Low staffing levels, inappropriate skill mix, rigid implementation of protocols, cultural 
communication processes constrained RRS implementation.  
How should the findings be used to influence policy/practice/research/education?  
• Staff empowerment is central to organisational change initiatives. 
• Education of staff needs to be ward-based and ongoing to facilitate learning. 
• Flexible implementation of protocols facilitates use of clinical judgement by trained staff.  
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INTRODUCTION  
The concept of the Rapid Response System (RRS) was developed by expert consensus 
opinion as a solution to address suboptimal ward-based care and reduce the number of 
preventable hospital deaths (DoH 2000). The framework provides a mechanism to improve 
recognition of and clinical response to, patients who deteriorate in hospital. It entails a 
systematic change in the way hospitals deliver care. Essential features of the RRS comprise 
four interrelated systems: an afferent arm which is the "physiological assessment" and 
"triggering" mechanism; an efferent arm which provides competent personnel and resources 
at the bedside and treatment if necessary; a governance/administrative structure to supply and 
organize resources; and a mechanism to evaluate crisis antecedents and promote hospital 
process improvement to prevent future events (DeVita et al. 2006). Implementing all 
components of the RRS should ensure that most deteriorating hospital patients are identified 
early through the use of Early Warning System (EWS) charts; referred early using 
protocolised graded response strategies; and managed by professionals with appropriate 
specialist knowledge and skills in acute care. The intention is to provide safe, effective and 
equitable acute care to all patients in hospital.     
 
Background 
RRSs have been adopted internationally despite the lack of high grade evidence to support 
their effectiveness (McGaughey et al. 2007; Chan et al. 2010, McNeill & Bryden 2013, Alam 
et al. 2014). Studies have been predominately retrospective, uncontrolled or historically 
controlled before-and-after studies (Moon et al. 2011, Howell et al. 2012, Al-Qahtani et al. 
2013, Etter et al. 2014, Sefton et al. 2015). To date, only two randomised controlled trials 
(RCTs) have evaluated RSS (Priestly et al. 2004, MERIT et al. 2005). These studies have 
focused primarily on measuring patient outcomes (unanticipated ICU admission, death, 
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cardiac arrest) of the efferent arm of the RRS, with limited assessment of the context, 
processes or mechanisms leading to the outcomes ie the afferent arm. Consequently, research 
has provided limited clinical answers to explain why such a conceptually logical model as 
RRS does or does not work in practice. To address this gap in the evidence, we set out to 
explore the implementation and delivery of components of the RRS in two Northern Ireland 
hospitals to identify those contexts and mechanisms that enable and constrain the recognition, 
referral and management of deteriorating patients in practice using a realistic evaluation 
approach.  
 
THE STUDY 
Aim 
To test the RRS programme theory against actual practice components of the RRS 
implemented to identify those contexts and mechanisms which have an impact on the 
successful achievement of desired outcomes in practice.  
Design  
Realistic Evaluation (RE) is a theory driven approach used to explore and explain programme 
systems and the relationship between context (C), mechanism (M) and the outcomes (O). RE 
assumes that all programmes have an underlying theory to explain how a particular 
intervention is ‘meant’ to work. The purpose of the RE approach is to identify the underlying 
programme theory and test hypothesised causal relationships between the CMO concepts by 
gathering data to clarify and refine the theory (Pawson & Tilley 1997).   
Stage one involved: (a) describing the RRS theory by undertaking a realist review of the 
literature; (b) interviewing people who had introduced the RRS to understand how the 
programme was meant to work; and (c) generating hypotheses of how it was supposed to 
work (developing theoretical propositions). Stage two involved collecting data from multiple 
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sources (hospital staff and documents) to determine how it actually worked in practice. Stage 
three involved establishing causal relationships to explain how in different contexts (C) 
various mechanisms (M) are triggered to generate outcome (O) patterns (typically called 
CMO configurations).   
 
We used a multiple case study of two hospital sites with embedded subgroups of two hospital 
wards on each site (Figure 1). The sites were large hospitals in Northern Ireland with a 
similar Intensive Care Unit (ICU) provision and at that time neither hospital had funding to 
implement a multidisciplinary Critical Care Outreach Service (CCOS) to support ward staff 
with critical care staff competent in managing patient deterioration (Supplementary 
information Table 1).  The sites had implemented Early Warning Systems (EWS) across their 
acute wards and operated Acute Life Threatening Events- Recognition and Treatment 
(ALERT) training for staff (Smith et al. 2002). In each site, one medical and one surgical 
ward were selected to represent a high and low risk ward based on the number of 
unanticipated ICU admissions over the previous year from the hospital admission records. 
Recruiting subgroups based on type of ward and level of risk allowed us to capture broad 
variation in potential factors that may have contributed to its success or failure. 
 
Participants  
Stage 1 Interviews: We recruited a purposive sample of 14 medical and nursing policymakers 
with a key role in the strategic planning and implementation of RRS, medical and nursing 
staff who had championed the implementation of EWS and the ALERT training programmes 
and external experts (Minister of Health, ALERT expert) to explore how RRS was 
implemented in practice. Participants were personally invited for face to face interview by 
letter by JM. This was followed up by a phone call to ascertain agreement to participate.  
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Stage 2 Interviews: Individual face to face interviews were undertaken with a purposeful 
sample of 28 key informants (senior managers, managers, junior doctors, EWS and ALERT 
champions), who were invited by letter and followed up by phone call, to determine their 
views of the conjectured RRS theories and to compare these with their actual experiences. 
Five key informants (2 in case site 1 & 3 in case site 2) interviewed in Stage 1 also 
participated in key informant interviews in Stage 2 to clarify and explain the findings from 
Stage 1 further in relation to the conjectured RRS theoretical assumptions. Focus group 
interviews were conducted with 34 key informants (staff nurses, student nurses or health care 
assistants) who had not been interviewed in Stage 1 or Stage 2 individual interviews and 
agreed to participate following a letter of invitation distributed to all ward staff by ward 
managers (Table 1). Staff who opted-in by returning reply slips were followed up by phone 
call. Separate focus groups were undertaken for staff nurses, student nurses and health care 
assistants to overcome the negative impact of power differences between professionals 
(Stewart et al 2007).    
Stage 2 non-participant observation: All ward staff were provided with a letter of invitation 
from ward managers to participate in the observation period. Those staff who opt-in were 
followed up by phone call and rostered to work on the observational days.  
 
Data collection 
The three stages of the RE process guided the data collection and analysis. The study protocol 
outlines the methods in full detail (McGaughey et al. 2010). A synopsis of the methods is 
presented here. The organisational structure reported here was in place in 2010 during data 
collection.  
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Stage 1: Developing Theoretical Propositions  
To develop the theoretical propositions, we undertook a realist review of the literature; 
interviewed key senior policymakers and managers; and obtained key policy and training 
documents to provide contextual information.  
Realist Review: The realist review was undertaken (McGaughey submitted for JAN 
publication) prior to the interviews to illustrate the underpinning theory of how RRS is 
supposed to work and reveal initial RRS theoretical propositions (Table 2). The findings were 
used to guide the interviews.  
Interviews: The semi-structured interview schedule was structured using the theoretical 
propositions identified during the realist review and from the implementation and 
sustainability framework devised by Greenhalgh (2004). Digitally recorded interviews 
(lasting approximately one hour) were conducted between July - October 2008 in agreed 
venues, principally participants’ offices.   
Contextual documentation: We obtained information from the acute care training records 
over 4.5s period from 2003-2008 relating to numbers and categories of staff who were trained 
including inter-professional ratios for each course, grades of staff trained, number of staff 
trained per ward and in Directorates since the ALERT course was implemented in the 
hospital (Table 3). Data was analysed in SPSS (2008).  In addition, photocopies of EWS 
policies were also obtained. 
 
Stage 2: Testing Theoretical Propositions 
Having established theoretical propositions of how the RRS was intended to work, stage two 
involved collecting data during interviews with hospital staff and observation of practice 
between June - November 2010, this time with a focus on whether the RRS was working as it 
should; and from EWS audits during May 2010 - October 2010 to provide contextual 
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information on trends in adherence.  
Interviews:  A semi-structured interview schedule was developed following analysis of Stage 
1 findings and modified for individual and focus group interviews to contextualise the 
questions to obtain different key informant perspectives (See supplementary information file 
1). Interviews were undertaken by JM and lasted approximately 30 minutes; they were 
digitally recorded and conducted in a private room 
Nonparticipant Observation: Nonparticipant observation of healthcare staff recording EWS 
charts was undertaken by JM on each of the four wards for an average of 8 hours (33 hours) 
from fixed points to minimise intrusion (See Supplementary information table 2). An 
observation guide was developed that captured information on ward infrastructure, working 
conditions and organisational processes (Greenhalgh et al. 2004). Information regarding the 
study was provided for patients on posters displayed on the wards.  
EWS Audit Documentation: With permission from Directorate managers, we obtained copies 
of the EWS audits that were conducted in the four wards to report on compliance rates, 
reasons for low compliance and action plans to improve compliance where data existed.   
 
Ethics  
Ethical approval was obtained from the Office of Research Ethics Committee Northern Ireland 
((Ref: 08/NIR01/15). The study was conducted under the requirements of the Research 
Governance Framework approved by the hospital Trusts and Queens University Belfast.  
Informed consent was obtained from all individuals who agreed to participate in the interviews 
and observation period. Documentary evidence obtained from the case sites did not contain 
personal information which ensured that the names of individuals were not known to the 
researcher and remained confidential.   
 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
Data analysis 
Stage 1 and 2: Data analysis 
Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim to ensure consistent and accurate 
recording of data. The Stage 1 transcripts and observation data were coded according to the 
seven key factors (external context and agencies; internal context and organisation readiness; 
communication; adaptors and adoption; innovation; implementation process and 
consequences) from the Greenhalgh framework (2004). The emergent themes from the Stage 
2 transcripts were categorised in the key components of the RRS theoretical propositions. 
Coding and categorisation in Stage 1 and Stage 2 allowed indexing and retrieval in NVivo8 
software (NVivo 2008).  
Stage 3: Cross Case Comparison & Mid–range theory development  
The synthesised data from the interviews, focus groups, observation and documentation were 
compared within and across sites and subgroups to provide an understanding of the 
similarities and differences. Cross case synthesis and triangulation of Stage 1 and 2 findings 
through a process of constant reflection and critique to compare competing explanations 
allowed us to refine CMO configurations (McEvoy & Richards 2003). These CMO 
configurations explained the causal mechanisms which produced outcomes in different 
contexts. Interpretation of these CMOs using an iterative and cyclical process facilitated 
theory refinement and the development of a mid-range theory to explain how and why the 
programme works in certain circumstances for certain individuals (Pawson & Tilley 1997).   
 
Validity and Reliability   
The realist review identified RRS theoretical propositions for testing and the Greenhalgh 
framework (2004) structured data collection and analysis to enhance validity and reliability.  
The interpretation of interview coding and categories were cross-checked by BB to enhance 
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reliability and reduce bias. Credibility was ascertained through the use of triangulation and 
respondent validation of Stage 1 findings with key policymakers in Stage 2. Documentary 
evidence of EWS and ALERT records provided an audit trail to enhance dependability and 
confirmability of findings. The emerging RRS conceptual themes were cross-checked the by 
the steering group members.    
 
RESULTS 
RRS Theoretical Propositions 
The realist review and policymaker interviews identified key intervention components that 
were thought to lead to successful implementation and sustainability of the RRS afferent arm: 
early recognition of deterioration using EWS charts; early referral using graded response 
protocols; and education or ALERT training to improve the effectiveness of care offered by 
early responders. The initial impetus for these initiatives was reported to have arisen from 
concerned staff and managers in the hospitals but was not generally supported until patient 
safety directives were prioritised by the Department of Health (DoH) and a cultural change 
occurred. These changes to establish Clinical Governance in hospitals resulted in new 
structures and roles to improve and develop patient safety initiatives within existing budgets. 
Hospitals then implemented these aspects of the intervention as a Priority for Action (PfA) to 
reduce the annual number of cardiac arrest rates. To effectively implement the planned 
changes managers recognised the importance of raising awareness, effective ward leadership, 
EWS and ALERT training and continued support for staff. The implementation of EWS was 
perceived by policymakers as an opportunity to change the task orientated culture of 
observations to a structured patient assessment approach and change mind-sets to improve 
inter-professional understanding and referral with: (i) objective criteria; and (ii) 
communication using the Situation, Background, Assessment and Recommendation (SBAR) 
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tool (IHI 2016). In addition, ALERT champions perceived that the standardised educational 
package adopted by both hospitals provided staff with a structured assessment framework, 
improved confidence, knowledge, skills, communication and teamwork. Theoretical 
propositions developed from this evidence provided an understanding of how RRS was 
supposed to work in practice. However, policymaker interviews, ALERT audit data and 
research evidence (Odell et al. 2009, O'Leary et al. 2010, Azzopardi et al. 2011, Shearer et 
al. 2012, Radeschi et al. 2015) highlighted that traditional hierarchical referral cultures, 
routine observation culture, competing workloads, low staffing levels, low nursing 
confidence and a lack of communication and interdisciplinary teamwork were factors that 
constrained implementation of the underlying propositions in practice. These factors were 
tested in Stage 2 to develop further and refine CMO configurations and RRS theory to 
explain those factors that enabled or constrained the implementation of EWS or ALERT in 
practice.  
 
Testing and refining RRS Theories 
Early Recognition 
In both sites there was a phased implementation of EWS charts and staff training to improve 
awareness, compliance and standardise the recording of observations on wards. The 
leadership role of the ward manager was perceived by hospital managers, senior nurses and 
champions as key to driving changes at ward level. However, hospital managers reported that 
the lack of change to the routine task of recording observations was associated with workload 
pressures due to continual resource issues to ensure adequate staffing levels for the level of 
patient dependency on general wards and the rigid application of recording observations 
implemented with clinical Governance in hospitals. As a result, staff employed several 
mechanisms to ensure workload was completed in this demanding and changing 
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organisational context. Experienced nurses would delegate the task of recording observations 
of patients’ clinical status (heart rate, blood pressure etc.) to junior nurses, student nurses or 
health care assistants (HCAs) as part of the ward routine to enable them to care for the sickest 
patients on the ward. Managers felt this resulted in a continuing reliance by staff solely on 
electronic equipment (rather than holistic assessment) with limited interpretation of the 
clinical observations or knowledge of appropriate action. Staff nurses reported that the 
pressure to juggle time-rigid completion of observations with other ward priorities resulted in 
charts not always being completed accurately or at an exact time to comply with the 
instructions on the EWS charts. Consequently, staff reported they did not always record the 
time of measurements on clinical observation charts and this meant that EWS audits did not 
meet compliance rates set by the hospital. Managers and champions recognised that EWS 
training, human error, competing workloads and existing custom and practice in relation to 
patient observations were factors that had an impact on EWS chart compliance (Table 4).   
 
Early Referral  
A clearly defined trigger and response strategy was implemented in hospitals to standardise 
the decision making and referral process. In providing a mechanism for nurses to ensure 
patients were reviewed within the appropriate timeframe, the EWS protocol empowered 
nurses and gave them confidence to challenge response delays or refer to a senior level based 
on their interpretation of the situation. This cultural change provided nurses with clear 
guidelines and authority to support decisions; which managers perceived reduced the 
potential fear associated with contacting the doctor and provided a structure to the system 
which facilitated decisions to call for help. This was particularly evident for higher trigger 
scores. However, at low trigger scores the protocol was used flexibly by nursing staff to refer 
patients based on their clinical judgment. Clinical judgement was underpinned by pattern 
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recognition and intuition based on subjective criteria of knowing the patient, normal ward 
practices, the context (situation, time of day, availability of medical staff and whether doctors 
were familiar with the patient) or individual circumstances and clinical experience. Managers 
and staff nurses reported that the referral protocol was viewed as a guideline and recognised 
that clinical judgement and individual discretion were used when referring lower trigger 
scores. However, doctors and managers perceived that delays in referrals were associated 
with junior nurses' lack of confidence, waiting to recheck observations and not reporting a 
single deranged physiological parameter. In both sites, ward managers and staff nurses stated 
that agency staff and student nurses were mainly responsible for not reporting EWS scores, 
high parameters or deranged observations straight away (often students provided a list of 
observations just prior to handover). 
An informal, cultural communication process was used by nurses during the daytime to refer 
patients to junior or senior medical staff as it was the most effective way to obtain a response. 
Nurses reported that communication reported to doctors was comprehensive. However, junior 
doctors stated that referral information was inconsistent (depending on the individual and 
experience) and often required having to prise information from nurses. Nurses did not use 
the SBAR communication tool during the day as there was limited use for a formal 
communication tool when there was no CCOS in place and ward doctors were familiar with 
patients. At night in both case sites referrals to doctors required an SBAR call to the Hospital 
at Night team. The use of SBAR at night required nurses to refer patients based on subjective 
criteria which was not compatible with a formal process requiring justification for help, was 
time consuming and elicited limited immediate response from doctors out of hours. 
Communication difficulties highlight the gaps in understanding each other's roles and 
responsibilities (McCrory et al. 2015, Michalec et al. 2015).  
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Early Response 
In both sites ALERT training was adopted and driven by champions in existing human 
resources to ensure staff managed patient deterioration appropriately at the bedside within 
their level of competence. Managers felt that ALERT training improved inter-professional 
communication and nurses’ knowledge, skills and confidence to provide basic pre-emptive 
management while waiting for help. However, doctors and nurses felt they primarily learnt 
from clinical ward experience. As a result, there was a recognised need by nurses for ongoing 
education on the wards, for placement opportunities to gain experience and to have a 
transparent educational role on the ward to facilitate ongoing learning and link course theory 
to practice. The nurse education role on wards at the time of the study was subsumed in a 
management role and as a result education was not viewed as a high priority, staff were not 
released for training due to staff shortages, there was limited competency based teaching on 
the wards and the primary educational focus was on attendance at mandatory training 
courses.  
 
Policymakers and experts felt that in most cases deteriorating patients did trigger a referral 
and a clinical assessment was made by junior staff. However, in a small number of cases 
there continued to be problems ensuring an effective and timely response to patient 
deterioration. Hospital managers associated these delays with nurses' confidence in initiating 
the response, or doctors not complying or responding to the trigger mechanism. Nurses stated 
that their lack of confidence in obtaining a response from junior doctors out of hours meant 
they often decided not to refer but to manage the situation on the ward. Indeed, key 
informants reported that there was a degree of uncertainty over making a decision to manage 
or refer patients. This uncertainty was associated with determining whether the situation was 
manageable when the EWS score and clinical judgment conflicted. In both sites 
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organisational practices and beliefs encouraged junior medical staff to assess and manage 
patient care within their level of competence prior to calling for senior help. As a result the 
response in many cases was to manage situations on the wards within their own realm of 
competence and to re-evaluate. An ALERT expert reported that most of the time the decision 
to reassess was an appropriate response to a transient change. However, on a small number of 
occasions staff failed to rescue patients as a result of making an incorrect decision that there 
was no underlying problem or to re-evaluate. This was perhaps a result of the most junior 
medical and nursing staff being the predominant responders.   
 
Clinical & Process Outcomes 
Standardised recording practices, protocolised referrals and education were implemented to 
improve accuracy and completeness of observation recording in hospitals and to reduce the 
number of cardiac arrests. In both sites, audit records on EWS compliance and cardiac arrest 
rates were maintained and reported as part of the Clinical Governance process. Hospital 
managers, ward managers, senior nurses, ALERT champions and staff nurses felt that 
changing cultural attitudes to resuscitation had increased the number of pre-arrest calls and 
proactive Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) management plans had contributed to the reduction in 
the number of cardiac arrests. However, policymakers, experts and hospital managers 
recognised that it was difficult to attribute these figures to any one intervention due to the 
complex interplay of numerous factors in the healthcare environment and no records of DNR 
orders maintained in the hospitals at that time. Documentary evidence on cardiac arrest rates 
across hospitals were not reviewed in this study.   
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Analysis of EWS compliance records showed an increase in the accuracy and completeness 
of recording practices over the five-month data collection period (Table 5).  Similarly, 
hospital managers reported that the EWS audits showed improved compliance rates, although 
they felt that charts continued to be inaccurate and incomplete as the frequency of 
observations to be recorded or actions taken for a triggered score were not documented. 
However, managers in both sites questioned the representativeness of the 100% EWS 
compliance rates captured by audit, as there continued to be incidents reported. Staff nurses 
perceived the EWS audit to be a burdensome waste of time and were not aware of feedback 
on compliance scores. They therefore viewed the audit process as a paper exercise of limited 
value in providing safe, high-quality care. Consequently, properly completed EWS charts 
were purposively selected each week to ensure a high compliance score in the audit and avoid 
further paperwork involving writing action plans to address non-compliance.    
 
DISCUSSION   
The RE found that RRS early recognition theoretical assumptions worked when experienced 
staff used the EWS protocols flexibly alongside contextual knowledge at low trigger scores to 
guide and inform their decision-making. Staff experience has been highlighted in this study 
and others as an important contributing factor to effective recognition and referral (Massey et 
al. 2014, Braaten 2015). However, when observations were undertaken by junior staff and 
HCAs, the early recognition and referral procedures did not work in practice (Ludikhuize et al. 
2011, Mackintosh et al. 2012, Roberts et al 2014, Radeschi et al. 2015, Johnston et al. 2015). 
This was a result of junior nursing staff rigidly applying the trigger criteria with limited 
knowledge or skills in patient assessment. Rigid application of EWS increased the number of 
false positive calls and medical workload as a result of poor sensitivity and specificity of the 
tools in practice (Azzopardi et al. 2011, Mandell et al. 2015). This perpetuated a ritualistic and 
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mechanistic approach to the recording of observations which meant cues were often missed 
and physiological parameters were reported in isolation. As a result junior staff were less 
likely to recognise and refer EWS scores to senior staff (Azzopardi et al. 2011, Pattison & 
Eastham 2011). The existing literature suggests that junior staff may lack confidence and 
experience in integrating theoretical knowledge in the clinical context (DoH 2013) to safely 
make these decisions (Shearer et al. 2012; Massey et al. 2014).         
 
Inadequate staffing levels and skill-mix on wards has been highlighted in this study and others 
as causal factors contributing to poor recognition and management of deteriorating ward 
patients (Donohue and Endacott 2010, Johnston et al. 2015) as a result of a lack of time to 
observe or follow up deteriorating patients (Hands et al. 2013, Jeddian et al. 2016). Research 
evidence highlights a strong association between mortality rates and improved staff ratios 
(NICE 2014, National Quality Board 2016).  
 
Implementation of the EWS protocol in this study empowered experienced nurses to call for 
help and to refer patients appropriately based on the trigger criteria and clinical judgement. 
The use of clinical judgement was viewed by staff as an important part of professional 
decision making to ensure the most effective use of time and resources in managing patient 
care. Research evidence recognises the importance of intuitive knowledge and pattern 
recognition (Pattison & Eastham 2011, Mackintosh et al. 2012, Brady & Goldenhar 2014, 
Clifton et al. 2015). As a result, the flexible use of EWS protocols in practice will have an 
impact on the implementation and utility of the National Early Warning System (NEWS) 
(RCP 2012) to standardise assessment and response of acute illness in hospitals.   
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Referral processes tended to be informal. Staff referred to junior doctors on the ward rather 
than using the SBAR communication tool which they found to have limited response benefit 
when contacting doctors out of hours or doctors who were unfamiliar with the patient. SBAR 
has not been widely adopted or used by nurses as it requires justifying the need for help 
which nurses find difficult when concerned about a patient (Ludikhuize et al. 2011, 
Mackintosh et al. 2012, Smith et al. 2014, Bingham 2015). Evidence suggests that this 
hierarchical communication and traditional response systems often delay calls for help and 
compromises care (Calzacca et al. 2010, Azzopardi et al. 2011, Radeschi et al. 2015, Braaten 
2015).  
 
The early response theoretical assumptions worked when nurses and doctors were given acute 
care training to improve awareness, knowledge and confidence in the management of patient 
deterioration. With regards to competence it was recognised that it is the responsibility of each 
individual to know their own level. This resulted in difficulties for junior doctors and nurses 
knowing when to when to manage or call for help. Delays in referral or response to patient 
deterioration were attributed to nursing staff making informed decisions based on their clinical 
judgement to wait and repeat observations prior to referral, or junior staff making informed 
decisions to manage the patient on the ward within their own realm of competence. Often 
these decisions to reassess or manage patients on the ward were correct but on a small number 
of occasions resulted in failure to rescue patients.  
 
Increased educational awareness changed the cultural response practices in the hospitals as 
staff called for help earlier and proactively managed patients who may not have benefited from 
further resuscitative or invasive procedures by discussing palliative care options. These 
changes in practice were attributed to the reduction in the number of cardiac arrests in the 
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hospitals. This evaluation and other studies highlight the difficulty of ascertaining whether 
reductions in cardiac arrest numbers were due to increased DNR orders or caused by improved 
outcomes due to timely treatment (Calzavacca et al. 2010, Oglesby et al. 2011, Downar et al. 
2013, Pattison et al. 2015).  
 
Limitations  
The focus group interviews with staff nurses, student nurses and HCAs were restricted to two 
or three individuals at anytime due to ward staffing levels at the time of the study. This may 
have limited the group dynamics and generalisability of the findings. In addition, the 
observation of staff and ward practices may have resulted in variations of behaviours. To 
minimise the Hawthorne effect JM visited the ward on numerous occasions to familiarise 
with staff prior to the observation period.  
 
CONCLUSION  
The findings highlight that implementation and use of protocols to standardise care and inform 
decision making will never be straightforward because individual experience, sociocultural 
and contextual factors have an impact on clinical decisions. As a result, organisations need to 
provide true multidisciplinary education and ensure experienced staff record, report and 
manage patient deterioration. This will require an investment in human resources to address 
current staffing issues and recognition by policymakers that the provision of high-quality care 
costs. This is an important consideration given the findings of reports on the quality and 
provision of care in England (Berwick 2013, DoH 2013, Francis 2013) which characterise the 
importance of a good culture of care. Pawson and Tilley (1997) suggest that the provision of 
reasons and resources enables programme participants to change.   
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Since completion of this study the case site hospitals have implemented the National Early 
Warning System (NEWS) to standardise the recognition and referral process. Further training 
and educational initiatives have resulted in the development of EWS training alongside an 
online SBAR training package. CCOS have been implemented across both case sites to 
improve response and management of deterioration at the bedside. Acute care training in 
ALERT has continued despite limited human resources and funding. A recent review of acute 
care training in the management of patient deterioration has been undertaken regionally due 
to the variation in educational provision and funding across the hospitals (Education 
Commissioning Group 2017). However, multiprofessional educational opportunities continue 
to be restricted by block training of junior doctors to accommodate organisational rotation 
practices. The success and sustainability of RRS requires further organisational changes to 
improve staffing levels and interprofessional education to address the main factors 
constraining implementation in practice.   
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Table 1: Participant sample and prior acute care training 
 
St
ag
e 
1  Policymaker Individual Interviews (n=14) 
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ge
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Interviews  Case site 1 Case site 2 
Sample Prior training Sample Prior training 
Individual   E
W
S 
A
L
E
R
T 
I
L
S 
O
T
H
E
R  
N
V
Q  
E
W
S 
A
L
E
R
T 
I
L
S 
O
T
H
E
R 
N
V
Q 
Medical & Nursing Hospital 
Managers, ALERT/EWS champions  
5 2 4 1 3  5 1 2 2 2  
Managers  5 3 3 1 2 5 5 5  1
Junior doctors  4 4 4 5  4 4 1
Focus groups    
Nurses  12 9 7 11 5 6 1 1
Student nurses 5 2 2   
HCAs 0 4    3
 
EWS, Early Warning System; ALERT,  Acute Life-threatening Events: Recognition and Treatment; 
(A)ILS, Advanced / Intermediate Life Support course and or Instructor; Other, Specialist nurse 
training (ICU, Cardiology, Anaesthetics, Renal)or III Medical Patients Acute Care & Treatment course 
(IMPACT); NVQ, National Vocational Training Level 2 or 3  
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Table 2: RRS Theoretical Propositions 
 
RRS Component  Proposition  
Early Recognition  Accurate, regular monitoring of vital signs on general hospital wards (Context) using 
a standardised EWS tool alongside subjective assessment (Intervention) improves 
recognition of patient deterioration (Outcome) by highlighting changes in 
physiological parameters to nurses (Mechanism). 
Early Referral  Predefined trigger thresholds with graded protocolised response strategies 
(Intervention) empower nurses to refer patients (Mechanism) to an appropriate 
member of staff (Context) who will attend within specified response times 
(Outcome).    
Early Response  Educational courses in caring for the acutely ill patient for all hospital staff at varying 
levels of competence (Intervention)  improves early intervention (Outcome) as an 
appropriate member of staff with the required knowledge and skills (Mechanism) will 
address deranged physiology according to the level of patient need at the beside 
(Context).  
Improved outcome  The use of a sensitive and specific EWS tool, with predefined triggers and graded 
response algorithm (Intervention) improves early recognition, referral and response 
to patient deterioration by staff (Mechanism) to reduce the incidence of cardiac 
arrests, unplanned ICU admissions and unexpected deaths (Outcomes) in hospitalised 
patients (Context).   
 
 
Table 3: ALERT documentary analysis  
ALERT documentation  Case site 1 Case site 2 
Dates records reviewed 28.7.2003-29.5.2008 19.12.2003-5.2008 
Total number trained  775 (15 per course) 599 (20 per course) 
Number of courses 52 28
Number of nurses trained
Number of junior doctors trained 
Others trained 
 
510 (66%)
244 (31%) 
CNP (1%), lecturers (0.3%),  
specialist nurses (0.5%),  
F2 doctors (0.2%) 
384 (64%) 
124 (21%) 
physio (6.3), ward sister (4%), 
senior doctors (2.4%) 
Number of wards across hospital 50 38 
Wards x attendance at training  A&E (n=58),CCU(n=32),Cardiology 
(n=27), ICU (n=23),Theatres (n=22) 
Medical wards ( N=30, N=25, 
N=24, n=24), Maternity 
(n=26) 
Courses block booked for doctors  13  6 
Doctors participating in MDT 
ALERT training 
26 out of 246  34 out of 140 
 
ALERT, Acute Life-threatening Events: Recognition and Treatment; CNP, Clinical Nurse 
Practitioner, A&E, Accident and Emergency; MDT, Multidisciplinary team 
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Table 4: Refined RRS CMOs  
 
Early Recognition  
             Context       
+                              
           
Mechanism      =    
           Outcome CMO Qualitative evidence 
EWS calling 
criteria poor 
sensitivity & 
specificity  
(-ve) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Inadequate 
staffing levels and 
skill mix for 
patient acuity and 
workload (-ve) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rigid EWS audit 
to record 
observations at an 
exact frequency 
imposed within a 
demanding and 
changing ward 
context (-ve) 
Experienced staff 
view EWS 
criteria as a 
guideline which 
is used alongside 
clinical judgment 
to refer patients 
at low trigger 
scores 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Observations 
delegated to 
junior staff who 
have limited 
knowledge, skills 
and clinical 
experience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Staff omit 
recording 
frequency on 
chart as not able 
to comply with 
rigid recording 
practices 
• Reduces false 
positive triggers  
• Clinical 
deterioration 
recognised by 
clinical 
experience  
• Lack of 
consistency in 
application at 
lower trigger 
scores  
• Use of clinical 
judgment might 
delay referral 
 
 
• EWS incomplete 
and inaccurate  
• Reliance on tool 
for recognition by 
junior staff 
• Less experienced 
staff lack clinical 
judgement to 
provide 
interpretive 
context for EWS 
scores    
 
 
 
 
• Calculation errors 
• Underscoring of 
EWS 
• Poor EWS 
compliance rates 
as frequency not 
recorded on chart  
 “.. you need to still be 
able to look at 
observations or even 
still look at your 
patient without having 
to use an Early 
Warning Chart to tell 
if your patient is 
unwell or not. ..It 
should be an in-hand 
system but it shouldn’t 
be a ‘the’ 
system..”(Surgical 
ward staff nurses 
02[07])   
 
“There is a level of 
intuition with staff but 
I think again that is 
something that not 
everyone has and some 
people have more of it 
than others.”(Senior 
Nurse Manager 
Medicine 02[06]) 
 
"...so I think that’s 
where the downfall 
comes, sometimes 
looking at the score 
and forgetting the 
observations of the 
patient behind the 
score really”. (Medical 
ward junior doctor 
02[17]) 
 
"..it’s just an 
instinctive thing that 
you do and sometimes 
we can look at patients 
and know by their obs 
that they probably 
should have a PEWS 
higher than they do 
because you just know 
your patient’s not right 
and they know they’re 
not right, it’s instinct.” 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
(Medical ward staff 
nurses 01[09]) 
 
"..what we found was, 
repeatedly, that their 
scores weren’t being 
done correctly, they 
were missing some 
parameters, the higher 
the score the more 
chance there was that 
it wasn’t added up 
correctly and that was 
a frequent finding that 
whenever they had 
totted them up they had 
got the wrong number 
and obviously that 
could change the 
response that was 
required. ...” (Senior 
Nurse A 01[03]) 
    
Early referral  
             Context        
+                                
          
Mechanism      
= 
                  Outcome  
EWS protocol 
establishes clear 
hospital guidelines 
for referral criteria 
and response times 
(+ve) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rigid 
implementation of 
protocol by nurses 
to comply with 
hospital policy (-
ve) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SBAR 
recommended to 
structure referral 
calls for medical 
help (-ve/+ve) 
Protocol 
provides criteria 
and empowers 
experienced 
nurses to refer 
patients to senior 
staff by 
providing 
objective data to 
ground clinical 
judgement.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nurses refer 
patients if EWS 
trigger score 
reached 
regardless of 
potential for 
false positive 
trigger calls 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nurses use 
clinical 
• Organisational 
change shifted the 
balance of power 
/authority 
regarding referral 
timeframes 
• Increased 
confidence of  
experienced nurses 
to refer patients 
without fear of 
reprimand  
• Inexperienced, 
agency and HCA 
staff fail 
responsible for 
delays in referral 
 
 
 
• Increased number 
of false positive 
calls  
• Wastes nurses’ 
and doctors’ time 
• Questions the 
validity of the tool  
• Infringes on 
professional 
acumen  
 
 
• SBAR not utilised 
as time consuming 
 “It would probably be 
your F1 because 
they’re ward based but 
obviously you wouldn’t 
undermine them, you 
would tell them but if 
you felt that maybe they 
weren’t taking onboard 
then you would just 
bleep someone more 
senior”(Surgical ward 
sister 01 [19]) 
 
 “I think that the 
structure of Mews or of 
any type of early 
warning system just 
makes the decisions 
easier for everybody 
involved especially for 
the people at the 
bottom up, it gives 
them the confidence to 
say,...‘it's not me 
making the decision to 
call you, I have to call 
you because the system 
actually…’, it gives you 
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judgment and 
contextual cues 
to contact 
doctors who they 
know and who 
are familiar with 
the patient 
with limited 
immediate 
response benefit 
• Patient referrals 
based on clinical 
judgement and 
hierarchical 
system 
another level of 
support...”(Senior 
Medical Manager 
Medicine 02[04])   
 
“..these things (EWS) 
don’t have sensitivity, 
I’m sure they’re going 
to people that are a 
complete waste of time 
and they’re probably 
missing some of the 
patients that they 
should be seeing”.  
(ALERT expert [12]) 
 
 
 
"..that’s something I know from our training when 
you did sort of disciplinary things, nurses were 
always were sort of told SBAR bit. I don’t think 
I’ve ever had a phone call where anyone’s used 
it". (Surgical junior doctor 02[24]) 
 
"I think the important thing was the doctor and I 
have worked together for a while anyway so we 
probably know each other and then I was able to 
bring her to the patient and then she felt as well 
that there was something maybe just not 100% 
right although when you looked at the 
observations they were fine".(Surgical Ward 
Manager 01[01])
Early Response 
             Context       
+                               
         Mechanism         
= 
           Outcome
Individuals are 
responsible for 
knowing when to 
manage or call for 
help when level of 
competence 
exceeded 
 (-ve/+ve) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ALERT training 
in hospital for 
members of MDT 
to improve 
knowledge & 
skills (+ve) 
 
 
 
Nurses and doctors 
decide to manage 
patients on the 
ward when they are 
uncertain of 
obtaining a 
response, when 
there is a cultural 
expectation to 
manage, uncertain 
if the patient is 
deteriorating or  
uncertain if the 
situation is 
manageable  
 
 
 
ALERT courses are 
delivered to align 
with influx of 
doctors in 
separately for 
nurses and doctors 
to accommodate  
• Uncertainty 
regarding referral 
decision delays 
response 
 
• Patients are 
managed on wards 
and re-evaluated 
within the nurses 
and doctors realm 
of competence  
 
 
 
 
• ALERT training 
increases awareness 
& improves 
confidence 
• Competence not 
assessed 
• Workload impacts 
on educational 
release 
• HCAs, agency & 
student nurses 
training in 
observations 
“I think the toughest thing is 
making a judgment call when 
you need senior help and 
when you can sit tight on 
something”(Medical junior 
doctor 02[22]) 
 
"I think what has maybe 
happened is that the algorithm 
has broken down at the first 
or second stage so someone 
who is perhaps too junior has 
been involved and again not 
recognised, but felt confident 
enough for whatever reason to 
say, ‘well look, they’re ok, 
...they make a clinical 
assessment and their 
judgement may not be perfect 
at that stage”. (Medical 
ALERT Champion 02 [08])  
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unclear  
 “..again we looked at the 
impact of ALERT on 
knowledge and that seemed to 
improve, we looked at the 
impact of knowledge on 
people’s attitudes and they 
seemed to improved but 
whether they really translate 
into a clinical outcomes for a 
patient it’s difficult to tell”.  
(ALERT expert [12]) 
 
 “I ALERT is much more 
relevant and think it's 
unfortunate there isn’t 
someone, there aren’t key 
people on the wards, we don’t 
have time to do it ....and I 
think that’s the missing link. 
It’s having that, the old 
clinical teachers”(Senior 
Nurse A 01[03]) 
Clinical and Process Outcomes 
             Context      
+                             
         Mechanism     
= 
            Outcome  
Changes to 
cardiac arrest 
team calling 
criteria & patient 
review (+ve) 
Ward staff call for 
help prior to 
clinical signs of 
cardiac arrest  
• Increased 
number of pre- 
arrest calls  
• Increased 
number of DNR 
orders  
“I know that we had more 
patients who would be 
admitted to ICU now than 
we had previously because 
we are preventing the 
arrests from actually 
happening.... the girls 
know they don’t have to 
wait until somebody has 
stopped breathing or the 
heart has stopped before 
they do call an arrest team 
or an 
anaesthetist”.(Surgical 
ward Nurse Manager 01 
[01]) 
    
Weekly EWS 
compliance audit 
& action plans 
implemented as a 
top down process 
to reduce adverse 
events (-ve) 
Ward staff 
selectively chose 
EWS charts that 
have been 
documented 
accurately on the 
ward to complete 
the weekly EWS 
compliance audit  
• 100% compliance 
questioned by 
managers  
• Continued 
evidence of 
adverse incidents 
• Audit viewed as 
paper exercise by 
nursing staff 
 
“The care bundle is more 
of an audit to make sure 
these charts are being 
completed correctly and 
being actioned 
correctly....It’s just all the 
information is recorded, it 
goes away to people in 
suits but it come back to us 
again and then we are 
supposed to reply back to 
them and in the meantime 
keep your patients safe”.  
(Surgical ward Nurse 
Manager 01[01]) 
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Table 5: EWS compliance data across case sites 
 
EWS Case site 1 Case site 2  
 Medical 01 Surgical 01 Medical 02 Surgical 02 
Data collection dates May - Oct 10 May -Oct 10  May –Oct 10 Sept- Oct10 
Time span 21 weeks 21 weeks 20 weeks 8 weeks 
Initial compliance rate 20% 80% 100% 55% 
Range 60-80% 85-100%% 85-100% 55-100% 
Noncompliant areas 
 
Frequency not 
recorded; 
Not recorded 
to frequency; 
no evidence of 
action 
Frequency not 
recorded 
Frequency not 
recorded; vital 
signs compliance; 
not totalled 
Frequency not 
recorded; not 
recorded to 
frequency; no 
evidence of action; 
not totalled 
Last compliance  rate  100% 100% 85% 95% 
 
 
